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x702124 EXCISE DEPARTMENT OF STATE DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY G/PM OP SECRE MEMORARDUM October 30, 1962 SUBJECT: Comments on Items III and IV of the Agreed Agenda for the State-Defense

The key problems for immediate decision are the modalities for removal of the offensive weapons in Cuba and verification that no additional ones are imported. Longer run arrangements will depend importantly upon the nature and functioning of these short term expedients. Monetheless, we must consider also the longer term requirements and arrangements which we desire.

Meeting of October 30

Long term verification requirements must be two criteria: they must provide reasonable assurance against clandestine introduction of muclear delivery systems into Cuba or other countries covered by these arrangements, and they must limit our freedom of action as little as possible. We are seeking to modify the Brazilian Resolution in order to avoid limitations on our transporting nuclear weapons through the denuclearized sone, but our main effort may have to be made at the time that Latin American and possible African regional conferences convened establish specific arrangements implementing this Repolution one solution for the problem in Latin inerica is to have the OAS set up a donuclearized some applying to territory under the jurisdiction of all members of the CAS (with covers Caba whether or not it attends the conference and concurs). Such an arrangement could apply to "all American Repouclis which did not mossess such carability at the date on which they adhered to the future members

inspection could be called into operation upon the allegation by any American Republic another member state was failing to comply with, or was preparing to violate, the above undertaking, and could obligate that state to permit without delay duly qualified observers to enter its territory for the purpose of verifying the allegation. Interin UN arrangements would presumably remain until such regional arrangements DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR could go into effect

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The second major problem in connection with long term arrangements concerns the extent of US or Hemispheric guarantees not to invade Cuba, and obligations by Cuba in addition to denuclearization. One solution to this problem is for the US to give no assurances beyond those contained in the President's statement of October 27, and not to specify perticular obligations required of Cuba. On the other hand, Khrushchev has in his message of October 23 already given a broader interpretation to the Fresident's statement than was intended, and for the US to leave the matter in limbo would tend to confirm Khrushchev's unqualified and broad interpretation of our pledge. In net, we think it would be preferable to include, in either a US or probably an OAS statement or resolution undertaking to reaffirm the obligations they have assumed in the Charter of the UN and the Charter of the CAS not to have recourse to the use of force in their international relations except in the case of individual or collective self defense or in accordance with existing treaties. This would permit freedom of action to the US and OAS in dealing with any situation in which we conclude that Castro was engaged in direct or indirect aggression against any part of or the whole of the Western Hemisphere. This could be made clear without being made so explicit as to unduly tie our hands in the future. The other alternative would be to tie cur existing non-invesion pledge merely to continuing compliance with denuclearization; this would appear, however, to be more constrained on future freedom of action than the vague non-aggression assurance.

The US should not, of course, assume any obligations not to assist insurrection against Castro, and should not commit itself on support to anti-Castro Cubans beyond reaffirmations of our UN and OAS Charter obligations.

William March 1870 2155

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